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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses a key issue in the current debate on economic development: the impact of glob-
alization on poverty. After having discussed the problems related to the definition and measurement
of both poverty and globalization, we perform a panel analysis which adds to recent literature by
explicitly considering relative poverty and by conducting robustness analysis with respect to data,
sources and dimensions of globalization. As far as absolute poverty is concerned, both trade open-
ness and the size of the government seem to be associated with lower poverty levels. Conversely,
financial openness is not linked to more poverty. With respect to relative poverty, trade openness
does not affect it significantly, while weak evidence suggests that financial openness and policies
aimed at reducing the size of the public intervention in the economy are linked to higher relative
poverty.
JEL Classifications:  I32, D31, F15, F21, C33.
Keywords: Globalization, Poverty, Trade Openness, Foreign Direct Investment,
Developing Countries.
INTRODUCTION
Globalization and poverty are multidimensional issues about which we still
know very little, and this is due to several reasons: (i) they suffer from severe measure-
ment  and  definition shortcomings, with the consequence that empirical analysis in such 
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topic is a minefield in which it is easy to lose ones bearings; (ii) in its current features,
globalization is a quite recent phenomenon spanning the last few decades of our econom-
ic history. As a consequence, the use of specific definitions, measures and sources of data
rather than others can yield different results and entail divergent policy implications. In
this connection, the construction of a reliable and independent database on poverty open
to different approaches should be one of the main goals on the research agenda. This paper
presents and uses a provisional framework for such a database.
While the debate about the effects of globalization on poverty, inequality and,
more generally, on social development is central in the mass-media and in the political
debate, the economic analysis is still in its infancy. Our contribution to this growing body
of literature tends to focus almost exclusively on the between-country relationship
between openness (trade and financial) and domestic poverty, leaving more thorough
analysis of the within-country relationship to other research (Santarelli and Figini, 2004).
The novelty of our approach resides in the following features: (i) we explicitly consider
the link between openness and relative poverty; (ii) we assess the robustness of the results
to other poverty definitions, namely absolute poverty, and measures coming from differ-
ent sources; (iii) we extend the analysis to a multidimensional definition of globalization
whereby it is not solely identified with openness to trade.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the recent literature;
Sections 1 and four present the data and the methodology used in the paper; Section 5 out-
lines the main results of our analysis; Section 6 makes some concluding remarks.
A REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE
Although globalization is a central issue in contemporary international econom-
ics, the term has been in common usage only since the second half of the 1980s. It can be
defined as a historical process driven by: (i) technological factors, such as the develop-
ment of ICT, which reduce the distance between people in terms of both space and time;
(ii) political factors, namely the demise of the bloc of former communist countries, which
meant the end of one of the two systems of production and allocation of resources histor-
ically determined: the centrally planned economy; (iii) economic factors, partially as a
consequence of point (ii), which have led the global world to adopt free-market orient-
ed economic policies and individual behaviors.
In short, the economic characteristics of globalization are: the increasing open-
ness of countries to international trade; the increasing liberalization of markets, particu-
larly through the elimination of barriers to trade in goods and services and the develop-
ment of an integrated international financial market; the decreasing role of the state in the
economy, following the adoption of what Rodrik (2004) has defined the stabilize, liber-
alize, and privatize agenda.
Theoretical analyses and empirical evidence in relation to the way trade open-
ness, financial openness and economic reforms affect poverty arise from a combination of
arguments  that  are used in different fields of research. As a basic rationale, if (i) growth
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is distribution neutral, (ii) trade enhances growth, and (iii) both openness and economic
reforms favor trade, then it can be argued that (iv) globalization is beneficial for poverty.
But the evidence, both theoretical and empirical, is much more controversial.
First, the trickle-down effect from growth to poverty reduction is based on the
assumption that economic growth is distribution neutral or distribution improving. This is
in contrast to the stylized facts of an inverted U-shape between level of development and
inequality consistent with the clasiical theory of capital accumulation.  (Kuznets, 1955).
More recently, many theoretical and empirical studies have dealt with the argument of
inequality to growth, growth to inequality and growth to poverty relationships.1 For our
purposes, however, it is sufficient to test the validity of the distribution neutrality of
growth. Such a test has been done, among others, by Ravallion (2001), and Dollar and
Kraay (2004). Ravallion (2001) concludes that growth is inequality neutral, spreading
equally to the whole distribution, thereby confirming that economic growth is the main
engine of poverty reduction. Dollar and Kraay (2004) support the same view, finding a
one-to-one effect of growth on the income of the poor. 
Second, as regards trade and growth, a broad strand of literature associates trade
openness with more rapid growth.2 Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) have criticized such lit-
erature for its alleged lack of control for other economic policies and its use of largely
unsatisfactory trade policy indicators. However, if the empirical evidence on the links
between trade and growth is controversial, even more puzzling is the picture that emerges
when the link between trade and poverty is analyzed.
As a matter of fact, the standard argument with regard to trade and poverty is
based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, according to which trade results in gains for
labor (the primary asset of the poor) since it is the relatively abundant factor in most low-
income countries. In this analytical framework one can alternatively assume that there are
two types of workers, high-skilled and low-skilled, with the latter being the relatively
abundant factor of production in developing countries (DCs). Openness would benefit
low-skilled labor intensive production, hence increasing demand and wages of low-skilled
workers in developing countries; since low-skilled workers are the most likely to be in a
situation of poverty, there would be a reduction in the number of poor and in inequality.3
However, the restrictive assumptions upon which the theorem is built are not sufficient to
provide a viable interpretation of the complexity of the real world, in which benefits and
costs of trade are unevenly distributed between producers and consumers of exported and
imported goods. Moreover, the adjustment to trade and to more investment may result in
additional short and medium term costs for the poor. Accordingly, the beneficial impact
of globalization on growth, and hence on poverty, would rely upon the assumption that
income inequality decreases as a consequence of increased openness. 
The allegedly beneficial effect of economic integration on poverty can also be
assumed to stem from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) if, due to lower levels of wages,
production of low-skilled labor intensive goods moves to the DCs. However, it is impor-
tant to stress that, as shown by Feenstra and Hanson (1997), international re-location
could involve activities that are low-skilled labor intensive for the investing developed 
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country but high-skilled labor intensive for the host developing country, hence overturn-
ing the effects of FDI on inequality and poverty.4
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002) put forward another argument in favor of the
beneficial effect of trade on poverty reduction. These authors affirm that if a country
wants to maintain an export-led development strategy, that is, if a country wants to rely
on free trade, it must maintain a framework of macroeconomic stability. Because stabili-
ty implies low inflation, this is another channel through which trade affects the poor pos-
itively, since the poor tend to be hardest hit by high inflation. 
Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) also support the view that international trade leads
to a stable world income distribution (though reducing poverty) even in the absence of
diminishing returns in production and technological spillover. Their model has two impli-
cations for our paper: first, international trade accelerates economic growth while keeping
inequality between countries constant: therefore overall poverty gains from openness; sec-
ond, no considerations can be drawn from this theory with regard to single country distri-
butions and, therefore, to national poverty ratios.
Empirically, substantial progress in this field of research has been made possible
by Dollar and Kraay (2004), who classify countries into globalizers and non-globalizers
according to their performance in raising their trade volumes in GDP; they then show that
the former group has experienced higher growth rates during the period 1977-97. They
also define as poor those individuals in the bottom fifth of the income distribution of a
country and they econometrically test the relationship between growth in average incomes
of the poor and growth in overall incomes, finding that the incomes of the poor rise pro-
portionally with average incomes. However, they find that trade openness accelerates
growth without leading to a sudden, one-time adjustment in real income. Rather, their
empirical findings suggest that more economic integration (measured with a range of dif-
ferent indicators such as the presence of capital control, tariffs and membership of the
WTO) does not have any systematic effect on domestic levels of inequality. They there-
fore conclude that growth is good for the poor.
Ravallion (2001) takes a more prudent position, pointing to the need for more
country-specific research, while Sala-i-Martin (2002a) concludes that in the years of glob-
alization both poverty and inequality have decreased.
UNCTADs report (2002, chapter 3) comes up with some stylized facts about the
links between poverty and trade. The overall conclusion of the report is that the current
conventional wisdom that persistent poverty in DCs is due to their low level of trade inte-
gration is too simplistic. The form of trade integration is much more important than its
degree. In particular, UNCTAD (2002) shows that completely different paths in poverty
are exhibited by non-oil primary commodity exporters (in which poverty has increased)
and by manufacturer exporters, which generally display a lower level of poverty. The for-
mer group of countries, however, is well integrated into the global economy in terms of
trade over GDP ratios and it has already undertaken trade liberalization. But it is becom-
ing increasingly marginalized in global trade flows and records low rates of economic
growth and a rising incidence of poverty. 
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Finally, Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004), in relation to 22 developing coun-
tries, find that adoption of trade liberalization policies stimulated export growth but raised
import growth by more, leading to a worsening of the balance of trade and payments.
Thus, trade liberalization is likely to have exerted a net positive effect on income growth
over the last three decades, but it may also have reduced growth below what might other-
wise have been had a balance between exports and imports been maintained.
The lack of a strong theoretical framework about globalization and poverty and
the puzzling empirical evidence call therefore for more research.
DATA, MEASUREMENT AND METHODOLOGY
Without entering the discussion on the possible alternative definitions of pover-
ty,5 for the purposes of the present paper it is sufficient to define as poor an individual
unable to achieve minimal adequate living standards, whatever these may denote6. We
built our database and methodology mainly on some recent influential (and controversial)
studies: we took some of the data used from Sala-i-Martin (2002a) and Ravallion (2001),
whereas we borrowed some ideas for the econometric exercise from Dollar and Kraay
(2004). To these, we added three important features: (i) we explicitly considered relative
poverty to be an important concept of poverty; (ii) we broadened the definition of global-
ization, which was not simply identified with trade openness, by including various meas-
ures of financial integration, liberalization and privatization; (iii) we tested the robustness
of empirical findings to different poverty and globalization definitions.
Measuring Individual Income and Poverty
International studies on poverty share many problems: (i) the low degree of com-
parability over time and between countries due to the use of different income definitions
(gross income, net income, expenditure) and units (person, household, household per
capita) in the original household surveys from which poverty indices are computed; (ii)
the choice of the ad hoc procedures used to deflate nominal values for changes in the cost
of living, since the general consumer price index does not usually reflect spending behav-
iors of the poor; (iii) the methodology used to correct the purchasing power of different
currencies; (iv) the underestimation of inequality and relative poverty due to underreport-
ing in the household surveys, which is likely to be greater for the rich.
As a consequence, when analyzing poverty in different countries, one should
bear in mind that poverty rates based on different indicators cannot be treated as fully
comparable. As shown by Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001), Chen and Ravallion (2001),
Deininger and Squire (1996), and Winters (2000 and 2004) some arrangements should be
made: (i) PPP adjustments, although not the best solution, should be used to correct for
costs of living across countries and over time; (ii) when studying poverty in the DCs, the
definition of poverty should be more consistent with standards of such countries; (iii) non-
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wage income and taxation should be adequately treated when conducting country-level
analyses.
Here we measured poverty according to alternative definitions and sources. In
particular, besides measures of absolute poverty, we extensively used indices of relative
poverty computed as the number of income recipients (or expenditure units) whose
incomes are below 50% (or 40%) of the mean income.7 It is true that the extent of rela-
tive poverty depends crucially on the shape of the distribution of income, although meas-
ures of relative poverty tackle distribution issues from a different perspective.8 On the
other hand, we emphasize that the assessment of poverty must consider social and psy-
chological dimensions linked to the type of inequality and to the social position or social
exclusion of the poor, which are better grasped by the concept of relative poverty. The
relative income hypothesis has shown that individuals look upward when making com-
parisons, with the consequence that raising everybodys income does not increase every-
bodys happiness, because in comparison to others income has not improved (Frey and
Stutzer, 2002, p. 411)9.
Finally, the use of relative poverty allows some measurability and comparability
problems to be overcome: (i) since all the incomes are normalized, no exchange rates have
to be applied; (ii) the problem of updating the poverty line does not apply because it is a
fixed percentage of the mean income.10
Our database is related to poverty in the developing world and was constructed
by adding information from different sources: (i) absolute poverty ratios (54 countries)
taken from World Bank estimates and referring to the percentage (and number) of people
living below the international poverty lines of 1 and 2 USD/PPP equivalent per day; (ii) a
different estimate of previous figures from Sala-i-Martin (2002b)11; (iii) poverty ratios
computed by national statistics offices using national poverty lines and collected by the
World Bank (World Bank, 2001)12; (iv) relative poverty ratios computed on UNU-
WIDER distribution data using 40% and 50% of the mean income as poverty lines.
Measuring Globalization
One of the most commonly used indices of the structural dimension of globaliza-
tion is the degree of trade openness, an indicator that has received only scant attention
from economic theorists (Harrison, 1996). This indicator does not only consider what a
country exports or imports, but also how much it exports and imports in relation to its
GDP: the ratio [(Exports)+(Imports)]/GDP will be used as an initial proxy for the open-
ness of an economy throughout the paper.
Many problems surround the definition of degree of openness: in particular,
trade flows are an imperfect proxy for trade policy and are affected by other dimensions
such as the countrys size and the distribution of assets. An important feature of openness
is the presence or the absence of policy distortions or trade barriers. These include tariff
rates or coverage ratios for non-tariff barriers. We therefore used other measures of glob-
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alization such as tariffs over trade or over GDP or, when available, indices of lib-
eralization like the Economic Freedom of the World index. This dimension is important
because it may be that, even though actual trade performances are dismal, highly attrac-
tive incentives implemented to foster investment and trade in poor countries are certainly
a better proxy for trade liberalization policies than actual performance (Anwar, 2001). Of
course, problems arise when attempting to aggregate these trade barriers data into an over-
all index.
As said, globalization is not solely openness to international trade, although this
is probably its most important feature. The liberalization of financial markets has brought
about a huge increase in capital flows, particularly in the form of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI). Hence, we included financial openness as another dimension of glob-
alization by considering gross or net inflows of FDI over GDP ratios, or FDI over total
capital formation13. There is much debate on whether FDI can be used to interpret finan-
cial openness: on the one side, due to the diversity in the nature and the intensity of the
alternative instruments that governments can use to limit capital movements across bor-
ders, a reliable measure of financial openness is difficult to find. FDI would capture only
one side of the coin: in fact, this variable measures the medium and long-term ability of a
country to attract investment from abroad. On the other side, most skeptical views of the
globalization process blame the liberalization of global financial markets for their alleged-
ly negative effects in terms of increasing financial speculation, unemployment and pover-
ty.14 In this respect, one has to be aware that FDI are likely to be correlated with short-
term speculative capital movements and therefore might also capture the negative effect
of portfolio movements and short-term speculation.15
A third factor characterizing globalization is privatization. We also attempted to
measure this aspect, by means of an index of privatization over GDP. Since this series was
available for only a few DCs, we proxied the variation in public intervention with the
change in public expenditure or in tax revenues, relative to GDP, over time. To disentan-
gle the links of these two variables with poverty, one should take into account several
issues: (i) social spending, which most likely affects poverty, is only one component of
total public expenditure with which might have diverging trends; (ii) tax revenue changes
might have different impacts on poverty according on how progressivity is modified and
whether or not these changes take place in a framework of macroeconomic stabilization
policies. To control for this latter issue, it is important to deal with the complementary
measures that may have been implemented to tackle both macroeconomic instability and
the adverse social effects of adjustment and stabilization programs.
Methodology
Although aware of the difficulties arising when one attempts to identify the links
between the evolution of poverty and the phenomena related to globalization, in this paper
we tested whether a statistically significant relationship exists between some dimensions 
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of globalization and poverty levels. For both concepts of poverty (absolute and relative)
we ran model (1):
povit = bo + b1TRADEit + b2FDIit + b3PUBLICit + xitB + ui + eit
(1)
where the dependent variable is the poverty index in country i at time t. and where
TRADE, FDI, PUBLIC are proxies for trade openness, financial openness and role of the
state respectively. These proxies were measured by means of the different variables pre-
sented in the previous section, for which definitions and descriptive statistics are present-
ed in the Appendix. Moreover, x is a vector of controls, which can be either time variant
or country specific, ui is the country specific residual and eit is the error term with usual
properties. Variables were all averaged over the period t, which is the five-year period sur-
rounding 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1998.16
According to what reviewed previously, supporters of globalization would
expect TRADE and FDI to have a negative sign (i.e., an increase in trade or financial
openness implies, ceteris paribus, a decrease in poverty ratios) while PUBLIC to have a
positive sign (i.e., privatization policies, which act to reduce the size of the public sector
would reduce poverty). However, opponents to globalization policies would expect the
opposite signs, particularly with respect to FDI (following Feenstra and Hanson rationale)
and to PUBLIC (since privatization hits safety nets which are mainly provided publicly).
The main problem with an undertaking of this kind is the high heterogeneity
among countries, which hampers the identification of stylized facts relative to the entire
sample of countries and which calls for the introduction of some controls. First, it is triv-
ial to underline that poverty is higher in poor countries, and that in model [1] there should
be a control for the countrys level of development. However, one may argue that the
absolute poverty rates of a country are completely determined by the countrys per capita
income and inequality in its distribution; therefore, controlling for per capita income on
the right hand side would imply that the rest of the variables explain inequality, not pover-
ty.17 For this reason we did not include per capita GDP in model [1], although the inclu-
sion of such variable marginally weakens the significance of coefficients TRADE and
PUBLIC and strengthens those of FDI.
Moreover, we attempted to find some significant aggregations of countries in
order to highlight different trends and behaviors according to various attributes and char-
acteristics such as: 1) export specialization (oil, agricultural products, manufactured prod-
ucts; 2) region (Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and Eastern
Europe, Middle East and North Africa, Latin America). Dummies to capture these two
characteristics were included in model [1]. The taxonomies of DCs introduced above were
employed for the purposes of the econometric analysis in order to single out possible dif-
ferences in the relevant coefficients determined by a countrys belonging to one or anoth-
er category.
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
As aptly shown by Easterly (2001), empirical analysis of the determinants of
economic  growth  can be misleading, since causality is especially difficult to establish in
this field. The econometric analysis reported in the present paper was even more difficult
than is usually the case for economic growth, because of the low number of countries for
which we had complete and reliable data on relative poverty and because of the scattered
observations available, which provided us with a high unbalanced and irregularly spaced
panel. Our sensitivity analysis therefore tackled the following issues:
Estimation techniques. Model [1] assumed the existence of country-specific
effects. We used the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test to check whether the
assumption of a country specific effect is more appropriate than the pooling of data. For
all the specifications run, the test returned a high value of x2, which allowed us to reject
the null hypothesis of no random effects. It is well known that models like [1] can be esti-
mated by using fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) techniques. The statistics of the
Hausman test we obtained depended on the specification of the model run and we did not
always get a value of the x2 statistics low enough to allow rejection of the null hypothe-
sis of no correlation between the country specific effect and other independent variables.
Therefore, the choice of the RE technique as the preferred estimation of our model pivot-
ed on the nature of the data we availed for: since our data did not represent the whole pop-
ulation of DCs but a random selection of countries depending upon the availability of
data, RE was our preferred choice.
However, other estimation techniques, namely Maximum Likelihood, Ordinary
Least Squares with Cluster, and Generalized Least Squares with heteroscedastic panels
and autocorrelated time-series were also used and results were reported. We have to stress
that the results we presented have to be read in terms of direction of the relationships, not
in terms of marginal effects and, to this aim, it is important to comment that the use of
alternative estimation techniques affected the estimate of the coefficients but very rarely
their significance and never their sign.
Proxies. The number of countries and observations used in the econometric
analysis depended on the index of poverty that acted as dependent variable, and on the
proxies employed to measure a multidimensional and somehow vague concept such as
globalization. Following Dollar and Kraay (2004) we used several techniques to test
whether different measures of globalization and whether the inclusion / exclusion of some
particular country explain the change in poverty.18
Model specification. The choice of the model specified in [1] was the result of a
sensitivity analysis in which we also added other variables and tried aggregations of coun-
tries alternative to export specialization and regional belonging: these included: 1) the
institutional context, measured by the degree of democracy (Gastil index); 2) structural
adjustment (countries which have or have not adopted International Monetary Fund or
World Bank  structural  adjustment programs, such as privatization schemes);19 3) exter-
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nal debt to GDP ratio (highly, middle, and low indebted countries); 4) religious diversity
(pre-Reform Christians, Reform Christians, Islam, Tribal, remaining groups such as
Hinduism, Buddhism, Oriental);20 5) urban / rural structure of the economy. We also tried
to address the issue of endogeneity by using instrumental variables. Some of these results
are reported in the next section.
RESULTS
In what follows we provide a tentatively comprehensive, although succinct,
description of the main results attained. 
Absolute Poverty
With respect to absolute poverty, the only source of data that furnished us with a
proper panel was Sala-i-Martin (2002a), which included a panel of 54 countries and full
information on poverty for 1970, 1980, 1990 and 199821. On the contrary, World Bank
data provided at the best only two observations on poverty per country, which rendered
the use of panel techniques difficult. However, we checked our results by running the
model, when possible, also on World Bank data. In Table 1 we summarize some of the
most interesting results we obtained with respect to absolute poverty.
In column 1 of Table 1 results from estimation of the basic model are presented.
The dependent variable is 1 USD/PPP poverty ratios excerpted by Sala-i-Martin database.
TRADE (a proxy for trade openness) was measured by the ratio of trade (import plus
export) over GDP, FDI (as a proxy for financial openness) was measured by the net
inflows of FDI over gross capital formation and PUBLIC (to embody the effect of the
public sector in the economy) was measured by the total tax revenue over GDP. The main
findings of our work with respect to the three main variables of the model can be outlined
by looking at this specification. Both TRADE and PUBLIC have negative and significant
signs, i.e. trade openness is associated with lower levels of poverty while a smaller size of
the public sector is associated with higher levels of poverty. Whereas the first effect is an
argument in support of globalization, the second is one against globalization22. More sub-
tle is the role played by FDI, which should capture the process of international integration
in capital markets: the sign is positive although not statistically significant.
The basic specification of the model in column 1 of Table 1 included as a con-
trol a set of dummy variables aimed at capturing geographic (and hence historical and cul-
tural) differences besides differences concerning the production structures. Regional dum-
mies for Latin America and Caribbean, North Africa and Middle East, Sub Saharan Africa,
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South and South East Asia were considered; Set Latin
America as base region, positive and statistically significant coefficients were found for
Sub Saharan Africa, which was largely expected.
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The specialization dummy was built by considering the most important export
sector for each country among agricultural, manufacturing, and oil & other minerals; high
poverty was found to be associated with specialization in agricultural exports, while lower
poverty was significantly linked with export specialization in oil & other minerals and (to
a less extent)  linked  with  manufacturing  exports,  thus  confirming  recent  results  by 
UNCTAD (2002) that the structure of trade is an important factor in determining the effect
of globalization on poverty.
Some estimation technique analysis was carried out in columns 2 to 4 of Table 1.
In column 2 the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) was used instead of the GLS.
Significant changes do not appear. When combining time-series and cross-sectional data,
it seems reasonable to assume that the error terms are heteroskedastic in the cross-section
observations and autoregressive in the time-series. Such a model is run in column 3 of
Table 1 where the dependent variable is the 1 USD/PPP poverty line. Previous findings
are validated in terms of sign and significance of the coefficients of TRADE and PUB-
LIC, while the coefficient of FDI tended to be positive and also significant. Mahler (2001)
suggests that for small samples it is advisable to use a Huber/White sandwich robust
estimator that clusters observations by country. The estimation produced with this proce-
dure is reported in column 4 of Table 1: to our aim this estimator has some disadvantages
because it mainly focuses on between-country variations and this might explain the
insignificant coefficients of TRADE. The same results of this sensitivity analysis also hap-
pened when considering the 2 USD/PPP poverty line as dependent variable (results omit-
ted for space reasons).
While in the basic specification of column 1 we inserted the most intuitive and
frequently used variables, it is clear that to measure and to estimate the whole process of
internal liberalization and privatization is a cumbersome task. However, a sensitivity
analysis can help us to shed some light on the topics under consideration. Column 5 of
Table 1 considers one possible combination of the alternative available series that can be
used to measure globalization: export over GDP to capture trade openness, net inflows of
FDI over GDP to catch financial openness and central government expenditure as an
index of the role played by the public sector; in this as in other specifications the sign and
the statistical significance of the coefficients remained the same: indeed the correlation
between variables used to proxy the same concept was high23 hence it could be expected
that results did not differ too much.
However, some general considerations can be of concern: (i) when the variables
used were measures of trade policy (as the value of export duties over total exports or total
(import + export) taxes over international trade), the significance of TRADE diminished;
therefore, it can be suggested that the effectiveness of trade openness, not policy measures
aimed to increase openness, is the relevant factor affecting poverty; (ii) empirical results
might be affected by the variation in the size and the composition of the sample due to the
incompleteness and the different coverage of the measures we used.
Sala-i-Martin database computes poverty ratios at 1 and 2 USD/PPP internation-
al poverty line. Therefore in columns 6 and 7 of Table 1 we replicated the regressions run 
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in columns 1 and 5 by replacing the 2 USD/PPP poverty ratio as dependent variable.
Results tended to confirm previous findings for TRADE, PUBLIC and FDI.
China and India are the two most populated countries in the world. Although in
absolute terms their trends in poverty and globalization are more important, their weight
in the sample is the same than any other countrys; however, their inclusion or not in the
study did not modify the results, as column 8 of Table 1 (run excluding China and India
from the sample) confirms.
Column 9 corrected for endogeneity problems, by lagging all the independent
variables of one period: it is interesting to note that PUBLIC became insignificant while
also TRADE was now significant at the 10% level only.
As highlighted in the previous section, the specification of the model run was
chosen on the basis of a comprehensive sensitivity analysis. Among other things, we aug-
mented the model with indices of indebtedness, both public and external, and with a con-
trol for the size of the country. Excessive internal and external debt can constrain the
degree of attainable globalization and reduce the gains or increase the costs associated
with specific economic policies. Public debt was measured by debt over GDP ratio;
External debt was computed by dividing external debt over GDP. Indeed, it is also impor-
tant to control for country size both because small countries are inclined to be more open
and because big countries generally have higher levels of inequality due to the existence
of regional disparities, which are likely to be associated with higher poverty rates. Since
no significant differences appeared in the analysis, results are omitted and the model spec-
ification chosen was therefore [1].
As described previously, poverty measures coming from different sources and
survey methodologies have been collected. We used, in alternative to Sala-i-Martin data,
World Banks data on absolute poverty. Results are presented in column 10 to 12: in col-
umn 10, the dependent variable was 1 USD/PPP poverty ratio coming from World Bank,
in column 11 the dependent variable was 2 USD/PPP coming from World Bank; in col-
umn 12 the dependent variable was 1 USD/PPP poverty gap. Due to the low number of
observations per country (two for three quarters of the sample, one for the other) we used
robust OLS estimators and clustered by country; therefore the results have to be interpret-
ed with care, prevalently representing cross-country variation. While the sign and the sig-
nificance of PUBLIC, regional belonging and export specialization were confirmed,
TRADE (and FDI) were not significantly different from zero.
Relative Poverty
With respect to relative poverty, we made our own computations of headcount
relative poverty ratios, using 40% and 50% of the mean income as poverty lines. We had
166 observations relative to 69 countries available for the econometric work. Within coun-
tries we had an average of 2.4 observations, spanning the period from 1970 to 1998 (in
some cases 1999). Our dataset, however, was unbalanced and irregularly spaced.
The basic specification of model [1], in which the dependent variable is the per-
centage of  the  population  with  income below 50% of the mean income, is presented in
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column 1 of Table 2. As in the previous section, we tested for the existence of country-
specific effects by using the Breusch and Pagan multiplier test. For all the specifications
run, the test returned a high value of x2, which allowed us to reject the null hypothesis of
no random effects; for column 1, the value of the statistics was 101.07. The Hausman test
did return x2 statistics of 1.54, which allows rejection of the null hypothesis of no corre-
lation between the country specific effect and other independent variables.
Some important differences in the results appear with respect to absolute pover-
ty: (i) trade did not enter significantly in the model; the sign of its coefficient, which was
always insignificant, was not even consistent across specifications. Such result, compared
to the impact of TRADE on absolute poverty, opens up important policy implications; (ii)
financial openness appeared to be an important factor correlated with higher levels of rel-
ative poverty, although this result was not strong across all the specifications; (iii) with
respect to public intervention in the economy, the tax ratio over the GDP was still signif-
icantly linked to poverty, although the relationship was certainly weaker than the link with
absolute poverty. In column 2 of Table 2 we used a different estimator, the Maximum
Likelihood estimator, in column 3 we corrected the model by assuming that disturbances
were heteroscedastic in the cross-section observations and autocorrelated in the time
series, while in column 4 we used OLS estimator clustering by country: FDI was not any-
more significant in these two latter cases.
However, it is important to point out that, contrary to what happens for absolute
poverty, the substitution of other proxies for PUBLIC into the model weakens the relia-
bility of the picture that can be drawn. In column 5 of Table 2 an alternative specification
is presented, in which export over GDP, net FDI inflows over GDP and public expendi-
ture over GDP were used to measure TRADE, FDI and PUBLIC respectively. While the
significance of the first two coefficients remained basically the same, PUBLIC did not
enter significantly in the regression anymore: hence it can be argued that social spending
seems to be particularly important for maintaining low levels of absolute poverty, while
in a context of relative poverty a concept more linked to redistribution seems to be rele-
vant.
Another interesting difference can be observed with regard to regional dummies:
with respect to Latin America, signs of the dummies coefficients were all negative and
significant, and this was consistent with the perception that a) relative poverty is experi-
enced by most countries in Latin America, and b) this remains persistent over time
although absolute poverty levels are on average a less stringent problem. With respect to
specialization dummies, there was no evidence of effects driven by structural differences
in exports, this again is a difference with respect to absolute poverty.
All these findings highlight that the effect of globalization on relative poverty
does not share the same features found with respect to absolute poverty. This is confirmed
by several other symptoms: (i) when the dependent variable was the percentage of indi-
viduals below the 40% of the mean income poverty line (columns 6 and 7 of Table 2) only
the measure of FDI remained significantly associated with poverty; (ii) the data might be
affected by problems of endogeneity: in column 8 we lagged all the independent variables 
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of one period: while FDI was still significant, PUBLIC did not have any significant effect
on relative poverty anymore; (iii) as in previous section, the exclusion of China and India
from the sample (column 9 of Table 2) did not have any effect on the results of the econo-
metric exercise.
Table 2.  Panel regressions: Relative poverty
Notes: in square brackets the value of z statistics; *, **, *** mean that the coefficients are statisti-
cally significant at the 90%, 95%, 99% respectively. The following variables, described in the
Appendix, were included in the regression: Column 1:  hpi50 = f(tra_gdp, nfdi_i, tax_gdp, region,
spec) Random effect GLS; column 2: hpi50 = f(tra_gdp, nfdi_i tax_gdp region, spec) MLE; Column
3: hpi50 = f(tra_gdp, nfdi_i, tax_gdp, region, spec) GLS with heteroscedastic panels and autocorre-
lated time-series; Column 4: hpi50 = f(tra_gdp, nfdi_i, tax_gdp, region, spec) robust OLS with clus-
ter; Column 5:  hpi50 = f(exp_gdp, nfdi_gdp, g_gdp, region, spec), RE GLS; Column 6: hpi40 =
f(tra_gdp, nfdi_i, tax_gdp region, spec), RE GLS; Column 7: hpi40 = f(tra_gdp, nfdi_gdp, cge_gdp,
I.region, I.spec) RE GLS; Column 8: hpi50 = f(tra_gdp, nfdi_i, cge_gdp, region, spec) with lags of
one period; Column 9: hpi50 = f(tra_gdp, nfdi_i, tax_gdp, region, spec) RE GLS without China and
India; Column 10: hpi50 = f(tra_gdp, nfdi_i, tax_gdp, region, spec, pop) RE GLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
TRADE 0.02 
[1.04] 
0.02 
[1.10] 
0.04 
[0.31] 
0.01 
[0.31] 
0.00 
[0.07] 
0.02 
[1.96] 
-0.00 
[-0.24] 
-0.01 
[-0.26] 
0.01 
[0.77] 
0.01 
[0.52] 
FDI 0.13* 
[1.73] 
0.13* 
[1.79] 
0.06 
[0.73] 
0.18 
[1.35] 
0.59* 
[1.89] 
0.12* 
[1.77] 
0.61** 
[2.09] 
0.29** 
[1.99] 
0.14* 
[1.87] 
0.15** 
[1.96] 
PUBLIC -0.18* 
[-1.88] 
-0.19** 
[-1.99] 
-0.16*** 
[-2.70] 
-0.18 
[-1.54] 
-0.06 
[-0.83] 
-0.10 
[-1.10] 
0.14 
[0.99] 
-0.01 
[-0.05] 
-0.20** 
[-2.05] 
-0.20** 
[-2.09] 
SIZE -0.00** [-2.05] 
Region 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Specialization 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Betwee
n
0.69 0.68 0.67 0.63 0.63 0.71 0.72 R2
Overall  0.63 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.67 
Wald χ2 113 71 (LR) 565 16 (F) 104 100 107 87 115 126 
No. observ.  134 134 122 134 133 134 166 98 128 134 
No. groups  57 57 45 57 57 57 69 59 55 57 
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In other trials we checked variables such as size, the effect of obtaining credit
from IMF, external indebtedness, democracy, political freedom, public debt and religion.
None of these variables seemed to be linked to relative poverty, except (as shown in col-
umn 10 of Table 2) country size, which were negatively linked to relative poverty.24
Finally, particularly in the case of relative poverty, our model mostly explained
between panel poverty (as the values of R2 reported in Table 2 confirm25) and it is less
useful for the purposes of analyzing and understanding the dynamics of within-country
poverty (on which see Santarelli and Figini, 2004).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The analysis of the effects of globalization on poverty, inequality and social
development represents now a hot debate in economic research, leading to a growing body
of literature. It is commonly accepted, in such literature, that the most successful countries
in raising living standards have been those more able to set in motion a dynamic relation-
ship between growth, participation in global markets and policy. Our contribution to this
debate focused on the following features: (i) we explicitly considered relative poverty
together with absolute poverty in the econometric study; (ii) we extended the analysis to
a multidimensional definition of globalization, including aspects of openness to trade,
financial integration, and the role of the public sector in the economy; (iii) we carried out
a throughout sensitivity analysis of model specification, data sources and variables used.
Although most of our results should be submitted to further analysis in order to
improve the statistical robustness, a few concluding remarks can be drawn from the
econometric study carried out in previous sections. 
First, in spite of the many counter arguments that can be put forward, some indi-
cation arises that trade openness and the size of the government might be associated
with lower absolute poverty levels. Conversely, financial openness (and still the size of
the government) tends to be linked to more relative poverty. Of course, this interpretation
is inferred from aggregate analysis of a huge number of countries. In this connection, it is
very likely that case studies performed at the level of the individual countries would result
in less straightforward results, with only a limited number of countries emerging as fully
integrated into the world economic system and able to raise their living standards and
reduce poverty. 
Second, there is a substantial difference between the results we obtained from
absolute and relative poverty analysis: this suggests, consistently with the previous liter-
ature, that relative and absolute poverty are two separate concepts, with different mean-
ings, measurement procedures, and theoretical links with globalization. In this respect, the
link between FDI and relative poverty can be supportive of Feenstra and Hansons (1997)
findings  according to which some aspects of globalization might be linked with more
inequality - while the Heckscher and Ohlin idea that a rise in trade raises employment (and
therefore the living standards) in developing countries could constitute the framework in
which  trade  openness is found to benefit poverty. Clearly, the role of the government in 
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setting low levels of poverty has to be interpreted in terms of provision of the necessary
goods to the poor as well as the achievement of redistribution goals. 
In sum, the policy conclusions stemming from our econometric analysis are
rather tenuous (in particular when using lagged variables as instruments) and no defini-
tive interpretation can be inferred about the effects of globalization on poverty.
Nevertheless, we believe that in terms of policy prescription this study suggests some use-
ful general lines of conduct:
1.  policy makers have to be aware that globalization is a controversial issue and
should be handled with care: the specific economic and social characteristics of a
country might be the key issue in determining its performance in the present global-
ization process. This implies that automatic implementation of standard procedures
could be less effective in certain countries and more in others, depending upon their
respective socio-economic features. In particular, rather than accept passively the lib-
eralization process, developing countries should attempt to manage their integration
into the global economy, by promoting the development of domestic capabilities.
2.  integration in international trade should be taken as an opportunity for achieving
important results in terms of economic growth and absolute poverty reduction.
Nevertheless, this does not exclude the need for intervention in trade, capital and tech-
nology flows aimed at promoting competitiveness (Stiglitz, 1996). 
3.  a more proactive policy agenda should be set to manage, and possibly to limit,
financial openness since it seems to hit relative poverty.
4.  the key role that can be played by the State in the fight against poverty and in the
achievement of development goals deserves to occupy a prominent position in the pol-
icy agenda.
Our findings raise a number of issues for future research. We have disentangled
globalization by distinguishing between free trade of goods and financial openness and
not attempted to test if openness is per se good for poverty. One might try to overcome
this limitation, implicit in the analysis performed in the present paper, by building com-
prehensive indices of globalization. Nor have we investigated whether the globalization
process has affected the dynamics of technological change and the early emergence of a
knowledge-based entrepreneurial economy at the country level. One might try to extend
this analysis by using patent counts and measuring the dynamics of entrepreneurship (in
terms of the share of business owners in the labor force) vis-á-vis that of trade openness
and FDI.
We regard such issues to be important areas for future research. 
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1 For a summary, see Bigsten and Levin (2001). See also Kanbur and Squire (2000).
2 See for example Edwards (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Harrison (1996).
3 It is however worth noting that, symmetrically, this process would lead to an increase in
both inequality and poverty in developed countries.
4 The ambiguity in determining the final effect of openness on inequality and poverty is
well debated in the recent literature and stems from the complexity of factors to take into
account, among which the existence of cones of diversification (Davis, 1996), three lev-
els of skill (high, medium and low) as in Wood (1994), the skill-biased nature of techno-
logical change (Berman et al., 1994), and the skill-enhancing trade hypothesis (Robbins
1996, Zhu and Trefler, 2001). For a survey of the literature, see Piva et al. (2003).
5 We refer to the huge body of literature on this topic for an extensive discussion on pover-
ty definition, conceptualization and measurement. See for example Ravallion (1996) and
Kanbur and Squire (2000) for a description of the methodological issues, and Ravallion
(2001) for a detailed bibliography.
6 In fact, the adequate living standard may include both the consumption of purchased
goods and the imputed value of households own production, or it may refer to the mini-
mal income necessary to undertake such consumption or to the physical availability of
goods and services. 
7 To compute these measures we ran povcal, the routine created by Chen for the World
Bank, on selected distribution data (mainly included in the UNU-WIDER database).
Owing to the availability of grouped data only, we considered the mean income to be a
more reliable indicator for building poverty lines than the median income.
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8 Relative poverty indices would not pass any of the tests of goodness that usually apply
to inequality indices, including Lorenz consistency.
9 For a survey of the main measures of happiness and well-being see Piergiovanni and
Pisani (2003).
10 On the other hand, setting the poverty line at 40% or 50% of the mean income is arbi-
trary and ignores that the perception of social exclusion may change over time (if changes
in income distribution arise) and may differ across countries.
11 Sala-i-Martin focused on a different and broader sample of countries with respect to
previous studies.
12 For updated figures, see http:\\www.worldbank.org\research\povmonitor.
13 Although we are aware that this measure does not fully account for both levels of finan-
cial openness: capital account liberalization and national treatment of foreign banks and
other operators entering local markets.
14 For example, the studies collected by Cornia and Lipumba (1999) show that, in the
case of Africa, liberalization of financial markets has attracted large inflows of short-term
speculative capital which induced large swings in the nominal and real exchange rates. A
major consequence of such speculative movements is a lack of adequate incentives to
potential private investors in the tradable sector. 
15 It has to be added that short term portfolio flows are often seen as harmful in the liter-
ature on developing countries.
16 For example, the period labeled as 1980 was composed of years 1978, 1979, 1980,
1981, 1982. 1998 was composed of 1997, 1998 and, when available, 1999. We used
five-year averages to avoid lost of information due to possible missing values and to
reduce the size of the measurement error.
17 Given the level of income, countries with higher poverty rates show worse income dis-
tributions, although the relationship between poverty and inequality is not straightfor-
ward.
18 Some results are reported in the paper. All descriptive figures on the absolute-relative
poverty/openness relationship are however available upon request.
19 Williamson (1990) summarizes the lowest common denominator of policy advice
addressed by IMF and WB.
20 The basis underlying this grouping procedure is the so-called Weber link (Weber,
1905; see. also Paldam, 2001), which identifies an indirect effect of the religion on eco-
nomic development. According to this view, some religions - in particular certain strands
of Protestantism - place moral value on attitudes (ranging from honesty to disapproval of
idleness and consumption) that are good for investment and growth. In general, these atti-
tudes have been shown to be widespread in all regions where the growth process has start-
ed  and  among  the initial waves of entrepreneurs, irrespective of which religion is domi-
nant in the region (see Lal,1998). However, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) have
recently found evidence that is consistent with the Weber link.
Openness, Economic Reforms, and Poverty 149
21 The set of poverty data derived from Sala-i-Martin represents a purely hypothetical
approximation of the real poverty rates, as this author to a large extent assumes the dis-
tribution of income in the case of many countries for which he has no data. This database
has been criticized, among others, by Milanovic (2002).
22 Of course, this does not imply that low tax revenue is always and necessarily an indi-
cator of the negative impact of globalization on poverty. In effect, a policy aimed at cut-
ting taxes and government expenditures might target poverty-reducing expenditures prop-
erly and reduce non-poverty related expenditures. 
23 A correlation matrix for the variables used in this work is available from the authors
upon request.
24 When we replaced the regional dummies with religion dummies, none of the religion
dummies were significant. This contrasts with the implications of the Weber link, and
does not suggest that any religion is associated with good economic attitudes conducive
to economic growth or at least to less poverty.
25 The within R2 is always below 0.10, whereas the between R2 is always above 0.60.
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